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Abstract. Entrepreneurs increasingly use reward-based crowdfunding to ﬁnance inno-
vation projects through a large number of customer investments. The existing academic
literature has predominantly studied factors that drive crowd investments and whether
crowdfunding predicts market success. However, we argue that the involvement of cus-
tomers goes beyond the provision of capital. As investors, customers enter into a principal–
agent relationship with entrepreneurs. Thus, entrepreneurs are often faced with a crowd of
customer investors who try to inﬂuence product development. We show that entrepre-
neurs can beneﬁt from this inﬂuence, because customer investors provide some of the
support usually received from institutional investors. Greater involvement from customer
investors thus increases funding success. This holdswhenwe control for creator ability and
project quality. The effect is driven by customers’ inﬂuence on product development and the
reduction in agency costs for prospective customers. We also link the involvement of
customer investors during crowdfunding to the crowdsourcing literature and show that its
positive effect is augmented by the elicitation of external information through distant search.
History: Accepted by Lee Fleming, entrepreneurship and innovation.
Open Access Statement: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. You are free to download thiswork and sharewith others, but
cannot change in any way or use commercially without permission, and you must attribute this work
as “Management Science. Copyright © 2019 The Author(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3211,
used under a Creative Commons Attribution License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/.”
Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3211.
Keywords: crowdfunding • new product development • crowdsourcing • entrepreneurship • principal–agent relationship
1. Introduction
Funding innovation through direct customer invest-
ments is a key beneﬁt of reward-based crowdfunding
(Younkin and Kashkooli 2016).1 The growing literature
on crowdfunding has predominantly studied the ex-
change of ﬁnancial resources between backers and proj-
ect creators (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2018), examining
backers’ contribution patterns (Burtch et al. 2013, Mollick
2014, Agrawal et al. 2015, Burtch et al. 2015, Lin and
Viswanathan 2016) and the rationality of crowd invest-
ments (Mollick and Nanda 2016). However, the involve-
ment of customers in reward-based crowdfundingprojects
goes beyond the provision of ﬁnancial resources. Cus-
tomers alsouse crowdfundingplatforms to share ideas and
suggestions for the products they fund. From the project
creators’ perspective, crowdfunding can thus be consid-
ered a distinct form of crowd-based knowledge sourcing
(Bayus 2013, Dahlander and Piezunka 2014, Piezunka and
Dahlander 2015), in which members of the crowd both
fund and inﬂuence the development of a product.
Customers’ﬁnancial stake in crowdfunding projects has
an important implication. Like conventional investments
in start-ups (such as by venture capital funds), cus-
tomers’ investments in crowdfunding projects create
a principal–agent relationship between customers and
project creators (cf. Jensen and Meckling 1976). As
principals in this relationship, customers depend on
project creators to develop a product that maximises
their utility (Nambisan 2002). Customer investors are
thus particularly incentivised to monitor project progress
and inﬂuence product development to limit divergence
from their optimal product (Nambisan 2002, Agrawal
et al. 2014). Therefore, when entrepreneurs seek invest-
ments through reward-based crowdfunding, they often
face strong inﬂuence from a crowd of customer investors.
The objective of project creators is to create products
that can successfully raise funding. On the one hand,
involving customers in product development can help
create better products (von Hippel 1994, Lilien et al.
2002). On the other hand, the principal role of customers
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may also impede product development. A crowd of
dominant customer investors with strong inﬂuence on
the project can subject project creators to the perils of
group irrationalities (Isenberg 2012). The loss of strategic
autonomy to dominant customers is a key concern for
innovating entrepreneurs (Fischer and Reuber 2004). In-
deed, it is well documented that “customers’ short-term
and current experience bias” (Wind andMahajan 1997, p. 6)
and their lack of technical knowledge (Magnusson 2009)
can steer projects into competitively undesirable tech-
nologies (Nijssen et al. 2012) or niche products (Ramdas
et al. 2007).
Thus, an important ﬁrst question is whether project
creators can beneﬁt from the involvement of customer
investors or whether increasing inﬂuence from the crowd
decreases funding success. We argue that customer in-
vestors assume some of the value-adding activities usually
carried out by institutional investors (Bottazzi et al. 2008).
Customer investors gather information about the project,
monitor project progress, and inﬂuence product devel-
opment. These activities affect funding in two ways: by
mitigating agency issues for new customers and bringing
a balanced “voice of the customer” into product devel-
opment (Grifﬁn and Hauser 1993). As a result, projects
with greater customer involvement raise more money
from crowdfunding than projects with less customer
involvement. We show that this positive effect of cus-
tomer involvement on funding is stronger for projects
run by individuals, which rely more on reducing agency
costs through customer involvement.
But do customer investors really inﬂuence product
development, and do changes to product speciﬁcations
in response to customer input increase funding suc-
cess? This is the second research question we address in
this study. Building on the product development lit-
erature, we argue that customer investors share “sticky”
information about their desired product applications
(von Hippel 1998). At the same time, customers’ invest-
ment in projects aligns their incentives more closely with
those of the creators, so that customers are less likely
to ask for costly niche products (e.g., Ramdas et al. 2007).
The result is a more feasible set of customer suggestions,
which allows project creators to identify opportunities
and adapt their products to a wider range of customers.
The effect of customer input on funding success is thuspartly
mediated by the extent to which project creators change
product speciﬁcations in response to customer input.
Finally, we link the involvement of customer in-
vestors in crowdfunding projects to the crowdsourcing
literature. By interacting with customer investors, crowd-
funding project creators elicit external information—such
as suggestions for newmarkets or product applications.
The elicitation of information from external “problem
solvers” is also the underlying mechanism of crowd-
sourcing (Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010). A main advan-
tage of crowdsourcing derives from the transformation
of distant search into local search through the elicitation
of distant information from external problem solvers
(Afuah and Tucci 2012). Does the involvement of cus-
tomer investors with distant investment experience also
improve the performance of crowdfunding projects?
This is the third and last question we seek to answer in
this paper. We argue that this is indeed the case, as
customer investors’ shared role as problem owners and
problem solvers facilitates the appropriation of distant
knowledge in complex problems. Furthermore, the ex-
change of knowledge in crowdfunding pertains largely
to the application of a given product. Hence, the in-
volvement of customers with investment experience in
distant domains of application (e.g., theatre and video
games) increases funding success.
We study the involvement of customer investors in
crowdfunding projects in a unique data set comprising
21,491 projects from a diverse set of entrepreneurs and
industries. Unlike most of the previous innovation
literature, which uses data on successful innovations
such as granted patents (e.g., Singh and Fleming 2010,
Chatterji and Fabrizio 2011; for a discussion of patent
data, see Fontana et al. 2013, Hall et al. 2013), pre-
screened innovation projects (e.g., Lilien et al. 2002,
Bajaj et al. 2004), or management questionnaires (e.g.,
Gruner and Homburg 2000, Foss et al. 2010), our data
comprise a balanced set of successful and unsuccessful
projects, thus reducing selection bias (Dahlander and
Piezunka 2014). The detailed data also allow us to
granularly observe actual instead of perceived customer
input and to employ a range of control variables, such as
creator preparedness and crowdfunding experience.
An important empirical issue in many innovation
studies is the endogeneity of project quality. In this
setting, for instance, project quality may increase both
performance and customer investor involvement: Good
projects may attract more funding, and customers may
be more motivated to support such projects. We address
this issue by using the introduction of amobile app as an
instrumental variable (IV) for customer involvement,
thereby controlling for project and team quality (we
discuss the instrumental variable inmore detail in Section
4.1, and we discuss its limitations in Section 6). Another
important empirical issue in crowd settings is social
learning, as customers’ funding decisions may be inﬂu-
enced by the sheer presence of other customers (Zhang
andLiu 2012, Burtch et al. 2013, Kuppuswamy andBayus
2017). We address this issue with an additional set of
panel models that explicitly control for social learning.
The results of the empirical analysis conﬁrm the
hypotheses. Customer input increases funding success,
in particular for individual project creators and if cus-
tomers with distant funding experience provide input.
Importantly, the effect of input on funding success is
partly mediated by whether creators adapt project de-
scriptions in response to customer input.
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This paper provides important contributions to the
crowdfunding and crowd-based knowledge-sourcing
literatures. The exchange of nonﬁnancial resources,
such as knowledge, human labour, and social capital,
has received little attention in the existing crowdfunding
literature (Fleming and Sorenson 2016, Kuppuswamy
and Bayus 2018). Departing from the emphasis on the
ﬁnancial exchangemechanism,we investigate the broader
role of customer investors during crowdfunding. We
advance the idea of a principal–agent relationship be-
tween customer investors and project creators and show
that project creators can beneﬁt from the involvement of
customer investors. The mechanism resembles the elici-
tation of solutions in crowdsourcing (Afuah and Tucci
2012). Crowdfunding may therefore be considered a
distinct form of “crowd-based knowledge sourcing”
(Piezunka and Dahlander 2015), which combines the
elicitation of solutions with their funding. The study
also has implications for the entrepreneurship litera-
ture, as we show that crowds of customer investors can,
at least in part, substitute for the value-adding activities
usually performed by conventional angel investors or
venture capitalists (Fischer and Reuber 2004, Bottazzi
et al. 2008, Ley and Weaven 2011).
We develop the hypotheses in the next section, de-
scribe the setting and data in Section 3, analyse the
instrumental variable models in Section 4 and the panel
models in Section 5, and discuss results, limitations,
and avenues for future research in Section 6.
2. Hypothesis Development
Crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to “raise capital
frommany people through online platforms” (Agrawal
et al. 2014, p. 63). To ﬁnance product innovation pro-
jects, entrepreneurs can use reward-based crowdfund-
ing to raise funds through product presales (Fleming and
Sorenson 2016, Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2018). Once
entrepreneurs have a prototype of their product, they
can create a public, reward-based crowdfunding cam-
paign in which they describe the product and their de-
velopment plans. After the campaign is launched and
before a set end date, customers have the opportunity
to purchase the product (called the “reward”). With
the money raised, the entrepreneur ﬁnishes product
development, produces the product, and delivers it to
the customers.
A key difference from traditional consumer contexts
is that, in crowdfunding, customers buy products that
do not yet exist. At the time of purchase, the products
are still under development and have not been pro-
duced. Customers who engage in such a transaction
make a classic investment: They allocatemoneywith the
expectation of a future beneﬁt (utility from the ﬁnished
product). The difference from more traditional forms of
investment is that customers receive a product rather
than a ﬁnancial return for their investment. People who
buy products on crowdfunding platforms are thus “cus-
tomer investors” (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2018).
Customer investors provide resources (funding) to
project creators in the expectation that the project
creators will use the resources to develop a product that
maximises customers’ utility. Customer investment thus
creates a principal–agent relationship between customers
and project creators: Customers act as principals, and
project creators act as agents on behalf of customers
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Principal–agent relationships
are commonly reported in domains that involve investors
(e.g., in venture capital;Gompers 1995), but they also exist in
customer settings (e.g., von Hippel 1998, Nambisan 2002).
Customer investors on crowdfunding platforms
face two agency issues (Hart and Holmstro¨m 1987,
Eisenhardt 1989). First, there is asymmetric information
on product quality. Customers have to rely on infor-
mation provided by project creators to judge product
quality and on the creator’s ability to deliver the promised
product. Second, the speciﬁcations for a product are not
ﬁxed until the end of its crowdfunding campaign. After
making an investment, customers are therefore con-
cerned about monitoring project progress to ensure
that the agent (i.e., the creator) does not change product
speciﬁcations against their interests. These agency issues
provide a rational motivation for why customers get
actively involved in crowdfunding projects. As inves-
tors, customers interact with creators to gather infor-
mation on product quality and monitor project progress
to protect their investment (Gompers 1995). As customers,
they attempt to inﬂuence malleable product speciﬁca-
tions based on their own needs (Larsson and Bowen
1989, von Hippel 1998, Nambisan 2002).
Similar to the involvement of traditional investors
in ventures (Bottazzi et al. 2008), the involvement of
customer investors in crowdfunding projects has the
potential to create value for project creators.
First, customers can help with product speciﬁcations.
As investors, customers have an interest in a successful
funding campaign. As customers, they possess knowl-
edge of the application environment inwhich the product
is eventually going to be used (von Hippel 1998). Cus-
tomers’ application-speciﬁc knowledge relates to their
needs and the way in which a product can address these
needs. Such external knowledge is a key resource for
crowdfunding projects, because projects of this type are
often resource-constrained and dependent upon knowl-
edge rejuvenation (Yli-Renko et al. 2001, Priem et al.
2012). If customers share their application-speciﬁc
knowledge, project creators can better adapt product
speciﬁcations to customer needs. Products that are more
adapted to customer needs will attract additional cus-
tomers more easily and thus receive more funding.
Second, customer involvement also directly addresses
the agency issues of prospective customers. When in-
stitutional investors face asymmetric information, they
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rely on the reputation of previously afﬁliated investors
as a signal of a venture’s quality (Hsu 2004). Similarly, in
crowdfunding, prospective customers rely on existing
customers when judging the quality of a crowdfunding
project. Because customers do not carry an institutional
reputation, prospective customers infer the quality of
existing customers from their observable involvement
in the project. Highly involved customers are a sign of
quality and reduce the uncertainty surrounding product
quality.
Moreover, existing customers who actively interact
with project creators also reduce the additional mon-
itoring costs for prospective customers. Monitoring the
activities of ventures is a way in which traditional
investors mitigate agency issues arising from the exe-
cution of a project (Gompers 1995). In crowdfunding,
customer investors are the primary entity monitoring
project creators. The onus is on customers to evaluate
project progress and to exert inﬂuence on creators if
they see their interests being threatened. Customers
who want to invest in crowdfunding projects thus face
monitoring costs. An existing community of involved
customers is a signal to new customers that the project
is being monitored diligently and that the creators are
unlikely to act against the interests of the customers.
This reduces the monitoring costs for prospective
customers, making them more likely to invest in the
project. We therefore arrive at the ﬁrst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). During a crowdfunding campaign,
greater customer input increases funding success.
Because customer involvement mitigates the agency
concerns of prospective customers, its effect on funding
will be greater for projects run by individuals than for
projects run by teams. Teams have more resources
available to run crowdfunding campaigns and develop
products than individuals do. For example, teams
possess more diverse knowledge, because each team
member brings his or her own previous knowledge and
perspective to the project (West and Anderson 1996).
Teams also have larger networks that they can rely on
for funding and product development support (Singh
and Fleming 2010). For these reasons, prospective
customers face greater uncertainty about product
quality and project execution when they invest in in-
dividual projects. It is therefore important for indi-
vidual projects to alleviate prospective customers’
agency concerns through customer involvement (H1).
In response to the uncertainty surrounding individual
projects, prospective customers pay more attention to
the involvement of existing customers in such projects.
Every unit of input from existing customers thus has
a greater impact on the investment decisions of pro-
spective customers. Therefore, individual creators beneﬁt
more than team creators from customer involvement.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). During a crowdfunding campaign, the
beneﬁcial effect of customer input on funding success is
greater for individual creators than for teams.
Part of the argument for Hypothesis 1 is that cus-
tomer involvement increases funding because it allows
customers to inﬂuence product speciﬁcations. Cus-
tomers are experts on product applications (vonHippel
1998), meaning how products are used and how they
generate value for consumers (Priem 2007). The elici-
tation of such application-speciﬁc information can im-
prove product development performance (e.g., Lilien
et al. 2002). However, latent application-speciﬁc infor-
mation is sticky, meaning that it is costly to transfer from
customers to organisations (von Hippel 1998). In crowd-
funding, customers share sticky information because
their investment in the project motivates them to in-
ﬂuence product development (H1). By sharing application-
speciﬁc information, such as requesting a certain
feature, customers can reduce agency costs (residual
loss) by directing product development toward their
own needs.
When project creators are confronted with a large
crowd of customer investors who are acting only in
their own self-interest, it is hard to know which ideas
have the potential to increase a product’s success and
which are expressions of costly niche interests (Ramdas
et al. 2007, Nijssen et al. 2012). Following an unsound
idea or trying to address all ideas may result in a
product that is unfeasible, too costly, or unattractive to
other customers. In that sense, it is not just the cus-
tomers who face a moral hazard from their investment;
the project creators also face a moral hazard from cus-
tomers’ involvement in product development. How-
ever, customers’ ﬁnancial stake in the project requires
them to consider project failure as a potential outcome
of their inﬂuence. When they submit ideas, customers
therefore have to balance their interest in a product that
perfectly matches their needs with feasibility and costs.
Hence, customers’ ﬁnancial investment reduces the moral
hazard for creators and leads to a stronger alignment of
incentives between creators and customer investors.
The application-speciﬁc information elicited from
customers is valuable to project creators, because it in-
forms them about customer needs. However, in order
for customers’ application-speciﬁc information to trans-
late into additional funding, creators need to open up
product speciﬁcations to customer input. Part of the
additional funding that customer involvement gen-
erates will only be realised if project creators update
their products based onwhat they learn from customers.
During crowdfunding campaigns, creators can do this
by revising the product speciﬁcations in the project
description. The effect of customer input on funding
success is therefore mediated by the extent to which
project creators revise their projects.
Cornelius and Gokpinar: Customer Investor Involvement in Crowdfunding
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Hypothesis 3 (H3). The effect of customer input on funding
success is mediated by whether project creators make changes
to project descriptions in response.
In the previous paragraphs, we discussed the im-
plications of customer investor involvement in general
(H1 and H2) and for the development of products
through the elicitation of external information (H3).
The elicitation of external information resembles tradi-
tional crowdsourcing approaches, in which a problem
owner (“solution seeker”) posts a problem and sub-
sequently receives information from external problem
solvers (Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010).
The beneﬁt of crowdsourcing is traditionally un-
derstood to stem from its transformation of distant
search into local search (Afuah and Tucci 2012). By
interactingwith a crowd of problem solvers with distant
knowledge, companies can optimise over larger parts of
the solution space and thereby increase the average
performance of the solution search.
However, there are differences between the elicitation
of external information during crowdfunding and tra-
ditional crowdsourcing approaches. Importantly, the
problems faced by crowdfunding project creators, such as
how to improve a given product, are difﬁcult to deﬁne,
modularise, and evaluate. However, for distant search to
be transformed into local search through crowdsourcing,
well-deﬁned problems that are easy to delineate and
modularise are normally required (Afuah and Tucci 2012).
Taskcn (Liu et al. 2014) and TopCoder (Boudreau et al.
2011) are examples of crowdsourcing platforms with
well-deﬁned problems and clear performance criteria.
In crowdfunding, this limitation is addressed by sharing
roles between problem solvers and problem owners. In
crowdsourcing, problem owners and problem solvers
are usually different: On the one side is a ﬁrm looking
for a solution, and on the other is a crowd of problem
solvers whose only involvement with the problem is
through the process of solving it. In crowdfunding, the
role of problem owner is shared between project cre-
ators and the crowd. Because the customer investors
own part of the project and are looking to improve the
product for themselves (so that they get more for their
money), they are problem owners in their own right.
This reduces the effort required for the project creator
to communicate and modularise the problem and fa-
cilitates the evaluation, transfer, and recombination of
distant knowledge, which is more challenging when
the problems are complex (Afuah and Tucci 2012).
Another difference is that crowdfunding projects
usually request funding for an existing product pro-
totype. The beneﬁt of distant search during crowd-
funding thus does not pertain to coming up with an
entirely new solution or product idea. Instead, it comes
from identifyingnewdomains of application for an existing
product, which often drive performance improvements
(e.g., Levinthal 1998). For instance, a customer who has
previously been funding theatre projects may be able to
help a computer game project by pointing out that an
interesting story with well-developed and enacted
characters might be more interesting to a wider range of
people. Customers who can provide project creators
with distant information about application domains
as a result of their distant funding experience are
therefore particularly useful to interact with.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). During a crowdfunding project, in
particular, input from customers with distant funding ex-
perience increases funding success.
3. Data
We test the hypotheses using data fromKickstarter.com,
a reward-based, all-or-nothing crowdfunding platform.2
The crowdfunding process works as follows. Entre-
preneurs start with a product idea and develop the idea
into a prototype. Around this prototype, entrepreneurs
then build a crowdfunding campaign, comprising a
description, pictures, and videos of the product. Before
a campaign starts, the entrepreneur determines the two
main parameters: the amount of money required to
move forward with the project (the goal) and the amount
of time needed to raise thatmoney (the project duration).3
Once a crowdfunding campaign starts, it becomes
publicly visible to everyone browsing the crowdfunding
platform, and customers can start investing. After cus-
tomers have invested in a crowdfunding campaign, they
can interact with project creators in the “comments”
section, which are similar to suggestion boxes on com-
mon crowdsourcing platforms (Bayus 2013, Dahlander
and Piezunka 2014, Piezunka and Dahlander 2015).
During the campaign, project creators can also change
the description of the project. Once the crowdfunding
campaign ends, project creators can no longer change the
description and customers can no longer invest. If the
campaign has met its goal, it is successful and themoney
invested is transferred to the entrepreneur.
Crowdfunding projects on Kickstarter fall into a di-
verse set of 13 categories, such as Art, Fashion, Games,
and Technology, and come from 138 countries (the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada having
contributed the most projects). This allows us to ob-
serve customer input in a wide variety of contexts, and it
avoids any industry- or market-speciﬁc biases. With an
average funding goal of $23,000, crowdfunding projects
are rather small compared with fully ﬂedged corporate
product development projects and are often at the fore-
front of the creative industries. However, crowdfunding
projects are comparable to smaller units of innovation
such as patents, which are often created by individual
inventors (e.g., Singh and Fleming 2010). Because many
entrepreneurs use reward-based crowdfunding for
presales, we treat backers as customers (Fleming and
Cornelius and Gokpinar: Customer Investor Involvement in Crowdfunding
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Sorenson 2016, Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2018); we
discuss limitations of this interpretation in Section 6.
Using data from Kickstarter.com has four key ad-
vantages. First, Kickstarter projects vary with respect
to the product, entrepreneur, and industry, and we
observe both successful and unsuccessful projects.
Second, we observe individual customer comments,
which allows us to use a detailed measure of customer
input. Third, the presence of changes to project de-
scriptions is observable to us, but not to customers.
Finally, there is an exogenous shock to customer input
about halfway through the sampling period.
We investigate the effect of customer input on
funding success with two sets of models. The ﬁrst is
a set of cross-sectional instrumental variable models
that test whether customer input increases the likeli-
hood of a successful campaign by using an exogenous
shock to address endogeneity concerns. The second is
a set of panel models that test whether customer input
increases subsequent funding, after speciﬁcally control-
ling for social learning (e.g., herding). In the remainder
of this section, we describe the sample inmore detail and
introduce the variables before we analyse the IV models
in Section 4 and the panel models in Section 5.
3.1. Sample
The sample contains twice-daily observations (every 12
hours) for all 25,228 Kickstarter.com projects that
started between October 2012 and May 2013. We ex-
clude a number of projects: We remove 1,711 projects
that end less than 1 month after the start of the data
collection or start less than 1 month before the end of
the data collection, because these projects would oth-
erwise introduce a bias for short projects;4 we remove
41 projects whose campaign was suspended for legal
reasons and 1,786 projects that were cancelled before
the end of their funding phase, because we do not
observe the complete funding phase and cannot con-
clude whether a project would have been successful
had it had the complete funding phase;5 we remove 145
very short projects (less than 1 week in duration),
because a meaningful operational effect resulting from
customer input is less plausible in these projects; ﬁ-
nally, we remove 54 projects that have more than 2 days
of missing observations.6 The ﬁnal sample contains
21,491 projects over a period of seven and a half months.
On average, there are just under 100 new projects every
day; 49% of these projects are successful in that they
raise the amount of funding they ask for (cf. Mollick
2014). The mean crowdfunding duration is 32.60 days,
and the median is 30 days.
3.2. Dependent Variables
To measure funding success, we use the cumulative
amount of funding (inU.S. dollars)7 a project has received
until period t: we call this variable Fi,t. On Kickstarter,
a largemajority of projects offer their products or services
to customers in return for money and generate sales as
a result. Although exchange of money for products or
services is common practice on Kickstarter, there are
some exceptions. For instance, funders can pledge
very small amounts ofmoneywithout receiving a product
in return or they may only receive replica or memo-
rabilia. However, even in these cases, the generative
mechanism leading to funding is very similar to the
one that generates sales for products.8 Therefore, the
amount of funding that projects receive in many cases
corresponds to the amount of advance sales they
have generated as a result of their innovation activity
(Fleming and Sorenson 2016). Advance sales are
highly predictive of postlaunch sales (Moe and Fader
2002), and an astonishing 96% of difﬁcult technology
projects on Kickstarter deliver their promised goods
(Mollick 2014).
In the IV models, we investigate whether customer
input increases the likelihood of a successful campaign.
To do so, we create a binary variable that indicates
whether a project’s ﬁnal funding amount is greater
than or equal to its goal. Speciﬁcally, for project i, its
ﬁnal funding amount Fi, and its goal Gi we deﬁne
FSi  1{Fi ≥Gi},
where 1{condition}  1 if the condition is true.
The resulting metric can be interpreted in terms of
meeting sales or proﬁtability goals. Proﬁtability and
sales benchmarks are two of the most used success
metrics for innovation projects (Grifﬁn and Page 2003;
that is, “estimated sales over ﬁve years” (Lilien et al.
2002, p. 1051)). We use FSi instead of the continuous
ratio Fi/Gi, because projects tend to be either just
successful or completely unsuccessful. As a result, Fi/Gi
takes the form of two consecutive power distributions,
which complicates estimation and interpretation. More-
over, in terms of success, there is no difference between
a project reaching 75% of its goal and a project reaching
25%—neither will receive any payout.
In the panel models, we investigate whether cus-
tomer input increases funding in subsequent periods,
for which we use the new amount of funding gen-
erated since the previous period (Zhang and Liu 2012,
Burtch et al. 2013). For project i, this is the difference
between cumulative funding levels Fi,t in periods t and
t − 1:
=Fi,t  Fi,t − Fi,t−1.
3.3. Explanatory Variables
We use the same explanatory variables in the IV and
panel models. In the panel models, we use all time-
series observations, and in the IV models, we use the
cumulative amount at the time a project reaches its goal
or fails (we denote this time as tF).
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Customer Input. Tomeasure customer input, we count
the comments customers have left on a project page.9
Customers can only comment on projects that they
have invested in. For project i, Ci,t is the cumulative
number of customer comments up to period t. We use
this variable directly in the panel models. In the cross-
sectional IV model, we use the cumulative number of
customer comments up to the period in which a project
reaches its funding goal: Ci,tF . To give credence to the
notion that customers and project creators have mean-
ingful and project-related interactions in the project
comments, we qualitatively evaluate the content of
comments in Online Appendix A and show that the
vast majority of comments (between 77% and 92%)
are related to either product features or project exe-
cution (e.g., delivery).
Individual Project Creator. To determine whether
a project was created by an individual or by a team, we
count the ﬁrst singular and plural personal pronouns in
the project description. A project was created by an in-
dividual (Indivi := 1) if the majority of personal pronouns
used in the project description are singular (“I” and
“me”); a project was created by a team (Indivi := 0) if the
majority of personal pronouns used in the project de-
scription are plural (“we” and “us”). Of the projects in
our sample, 40% (8,531) were created by individuals.
Project Revisions. To test whether project creators’
response to customer input mediates the effect of input
on funding, we count the changes creators make to
project descriptions. We identify changes by observing
the update timestamp in the intricate HTML code for
the project pages. Each time the update timestamp
moves forward, the project description has been
changed. We observe the timestamp once every 12
hours, and it is thus a lower bound for the number of
changes a project receives. Importantly, the timestamp
is visible to us, but not to customers. We use the cu-
mulative number of changes up to period tF in the IV
models (Ri,tF ) and the difference since the last period
(=Ri,t ∈ {0,1}) in the panel models.
At the end of a campaign, the project page cannot be
changed any more, and the product description at that
point determines the eventual speciﬁcations and de-
sign of the product (Kickstarter 2014b). It is thus im-
portant for project creators to incorporate all relevant
customer input into the product speciﬁcations as soon
as it is provided.10
Distant Funding Experience. To test whether input
from distant customers is more valuable, we measure
the distance of commenting customers in terms of
funding experience and then interact customer input
with distance. Distant funding experience resembles mea-
sures such as “content distance” (Piezunka andDahlander
2015), which calculate distance based on previous ex-
perience. For each project i in period t, we perform the
following steps:
• First, for each commenting customer j, we calcu-
late proximal funding experience as the number of
previous investments the customer has made in the
same category as the focal project ( FEXPj,t,CATi ). We
divide this value by customers’ total funding experi-
ence (FEXPj,t) to get the share of customers’ proximal
experience (the ﬁrst term in the sum). Because distance
increases the utility of comments, we measure cus-
tomers’ funding experience at the time of their last
comment on project i: t*  max{k ∈T : k≤ t, =Ci,j,k ≠ 0}.
• Second, we weight the proximal funding experi-
ence of individual customers by their share of all com-
ments (the second term in the sum; Ci,j,t is the number
of times customer j has commented on project i until
period t).
• Third, for each project, we sum up the weighted
proximal funding experiences of its commenting cus-
tomers and subtract them from 1 to arrive at the
weighted distant funding experience.
Formally, for project i at time t, the weighted distance
of commenting customers is deﬁned as
Di,t  1 −
∑
Customer j
FEXPj,t*,CATi
FEXPj,t*
×
Ci,j,t
Ci,t
.
We use Di,tF in the IV models and Di,t in the panel
models. Although we implicitly control for customer
seniority in this formula by calculating distance relative
to FEXPj,t in the denominator (total funding experience
of customer j across categories), we also run an addi-
tional analysis explicitly controlling for weighted
customer funding experience, and all results hold.
4. Instrumental Variable Models
In our ﬁrst set of models, we examine the effect of
customer input on the likelihood of funding success
using an instrumental variable to control for creator
ability and project quality. We describe speciﬁcation
and results of the IV models in this section before we
turn to the panel models in Section 5.
4.1. Instrumental Variable
As an instrument, we use the release of the Kickstarter
Mobile app on February 14, 2013. The app allows
project creators and customers to interact easily, even
when there is no computer available (Figure B.1 in
Online Appendix B). As a result, the mobile app in-
creases the amount of customer input projects receive
in all categories (Figure 1). As the app’s release is in-
dependent of individual creators’ ability and project
quality, the resulting increase in customer input is also
independent of creator ability and project quality.
Therefore, any change in the likelihood of funding
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success as a consequence of increased customer input
through the mobile app is exogenous, and we can be
conﬁdent that this is not a by-product of unobserved
creator ability or project quality. We implement this
procedure in a two-stage estimation (Wooldridge 2010).
In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate the exogenous increase of
customer input as a result of the app release. In the
second stage, we use the estimated exogenous increase
in customer input to estimate its impact on funding
success. The second-stage resultswe obtain are therefore
not biased by creator ability and project quality. In the
following paragraphs, we describe and evaluate the
instrumental variable in detail.
“Kickstarter isn’t a store” where customers sponta-
neously buy products, but a collaboration and code-
velopment platform (Strickler et al. 2012). A main
purpose of the mobile app is to let project creators and
customers easily keep track of their projects and in-
teract with each other (Kickstarter Executive 2014). The
app’s commenting function is easy to use (Figure B.1 in
Online Appendix B), and no repeated login is required.
We evaluate the quality of the instrumental variable in
a model without controls (model not shown). We re-
port a signiﬁcant positive effect of the introduction of
the mobile app on customer input (β1 = 0.55, p < 0.01)
and a ﬁrst-stage F-statistic of 24.86, well above the
common threshold of 10 and indicating a strong in-
strumental variable. According to the control function
approach (see Section 4.3), the second stage includes
the estimated ﬁrst-stage residuals (uˆi) to control for
unobserved confounders. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant residuals
in the second stage, which indicates an endogeneity
problem and thus justiﬁes the use of an instrumental
variable (γU = −0.30, p < 0.01) (Wooldridge 2010).
It is possible that we are observing a seasonal trend
that coincides with the introduction of the mobile app.
Because we do not possess data on the same time frame
during previous years, we must evaluate the trend as
we observe it in the data. Figure 2 displays the devel-
opment of the 30-day moving average of the weighted
daily average customer input (solid) and new projects
(dotted) by project start dates. The time frame covered
by the sample is centred approximately on the release
of the mobile app (dashed vertical line). There is a no-
ticeable and steady increase in customer input for
projects starting roughly 15 days before the introduc-
tion of the mobile app (the median project duration is
30 days). This increase quickly stabilises at around 150%
of the average prerelease customer input. We also esti-
mate the full model without the 2012 holiday season—
during which there was less customer input—and the
results hold. We are therefore conﬁdent that we are ob-
serving not a seasonal trend, but rather a substantial in-
crease in customer input due to the release of the
mobile app.
Although the app also allows project funding, there
is evidence that this is not a violation of the exclusion
restriction. First, the funding feature of the mobile app
was very hard to use at the time, as customers had to
have an Amazon account and to repeatedly remember
and enter their Amazon credentials (Figure B.1 in
Online Appendix B). Although this may not be a major
problemwhen using an internet browser (due to cookies
and stored passwords), it signiﬁcantly impeded funding
through the mobile app. As one customer noted: “Good
app, but I wish it was possible to donate without having
to create an account and go through Amazon payments.
I think this turns a lot of potential backers off” (iTunes
user, August 27, 2014). To alleviate the difﬁculty of the
funding function, Kickstarter later rolled out its own
payment system, replacing the previously usedAmazon
payment system (Kickstarter Executive 2014).11 Second,
crowdfunding customers are usually highly engaged
and spend a lot of time researching different projects as
“shadow artists.” Because of the uncertain nature of
Kickstarter projects (the products still have to be de-
veloped), customers need to look at projects with due
diligence to understand the associated risks before
funding them. This is reﬂected in project descriptions,
which often span several pages and contain multiple
pictures, videos, and even blueprints. However, diligent
evaluation of such detailed information is very difﬁcult
on the small screens ofmobile phones. For these reasons,
it is unlikely that the app independently attracted sig-
niﬁcant funding.
4.2. Control Variables
In addition to the instrument, we include several control
variables in the model to account for potential con-
founders—in particular, creator ability, project quality,
and project complexity.
We control for the number of videos in project de-
scriptions. Videos are difﬁcult to make and require
Figure 1. Average Customer Input by Category Before and
After the Release of the Mobile App
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signiﬁcant work and expenses from project creators
(equipment, scripts, prototypes, locations, ﬁlming, cut-
ting, sound, etc.). At the same time, videos are one of the
most important factors when customers decide whether
to fund a project (Kickstarter 2014a). Therefore, the
number of videos in project descriptions allows us to
control for creator ability and project appeal (Colombo
et al. 2014). We also control for whether a project has
a separate website, which requires capital and effort to
create andmaintain and is a sign of high-quality projects
(Colombo et al. 2014).
We control for the extent of projects’ risks section (in
terms of the number of words). In the risks section,
project creators are asked to describe all potential risks
associated with their project, reﬂecting their “ability to
complete the project as promised and whether . . . the
creator is being open and honest about the risks and
challenges they face” (Strickler et al. 2012). Creators’
openness about the risks associated with their project is
a good control for their understanding of the project as
well as for their own belief in the likelihood of success.
Risk is also an important outcome of complexity, and
projects with more associated risks are thus likely to be
more complex (Bosch-Rekveldt et al. 2011).
We control for whether a project is run by an in-
corporated organisationwith a legal name (e.g., Limited,
Ltd, LP). The organisational background of creators is
a good control for their resources, their experience with
new product development, and their ex-ante funding
network. Moreover, projects of incorporated organisa-
tions may be more complex than other projects. We also
control for project creators’ prior crowdfunding experience
as the number of previous projects they have created.
We include the natural logarithm of projects’ goal in
USdollars. The goal is project creators’ realistic expectation
of the minimum feasible project budget. The budget
allows us to control for the size and complexity of the
project (Müller and Turner 2007, Bosch-Rekveldt et al.
2011). For instance, a project with a funding target of
$20,000 (a board game) is less complex than a project
with a target of $100,000 (sunglasses with inbuilt
headphones) and a project with a target of $1,000,000
(a computer game). Similarly, we control for project
duration, which is also a common measure of project
complexity (Bosch-Rekveldt et al. 2011).
We control for previous customer engagement as the
sum of customers’ previous interactions with other
projects. Certain customersmay be particularly engaged
with projects, and some projects may attract such cus-
tomers more than others.
Finally, we control for project category. Kickstarter
categories include Photography, Dance, Games, Pub-
lishing, Music, Comics, Film & Video, Design, Technol-
ogy, Fashion, Theater, Art, and Food. Project frequencies,
number of funding transactions, and amount of customer
input vary signiﬁcantly across categories (Figure B.2 in
Online Appendix B). The base category for all analyses is
Design, because Design projects are well represented in
the sample and attract a good degree of comments while
avoiding the extremes of other categories (e.g., Games).
4.3. Model Speciﬁcation
Funding success is a dichotomous variable; hence,
a logit model is preferred over a linear probabilitymodel
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1991). To control for endoge-
neity, we use a control function approach in a two-stage
Figure 2. Weighted Daily Average Customer Input and New Projects by Project Start Dates
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estimation (Liu et al. 2010, Wooldridge 2010), which is
the preferred method when dealing with endogeneity
issues in logit models (Guevara and Ben-Akiva 2012). In
the ﬁrst stages, we regress customer input and project
revisions on the exogenous variables and the instrument
(Zi) in an ordinary least-squares model. We then use the
predicted residuals of the ﬁrst stages (uˆi) in the second-
stage logit estimations. The second-stage estimators are
consistent up to scale (Wooldridge 2010); in the case of
logit models, the obtained estimators are smaller than
the true effect sizes (Guevara and Ben-Akiva 2012). As
the obtained standard errors may not be strictly valid,
we use a nonparametric bootstrap to obtain correct
standard errors in the second stages (Wooldridge 2010).
We arrive at the following regressions for H1 and
H4 in the ﬁrst and second stages, respectively (IV
Model 1):12
Ci,tF  β0 + β1Zi + β2Di,tF + βXXi + ui
FSi  γ0 + γ1Ci,tF + γ2Di,tF + γ3Ci,tF ×Di,tF + γUuˆi
+ γUDuˆi ×Di,tF + γXXi + vi,
where Ci,tF is customer input, Zi is the instrument, Di,tF
is the distance of commenting customers, and Xi is
a vector of control variables. To estimate the interaction
between customer input and distance correctly, we also
include an interaction between the estimated ﬁrst-stage
residuals and distance (uˆi ×Di,tF ) in the second stage
(for a similar approach to endogenous interaction
terms, see Liu et al. 2010).
To test whether individual projects beneﬁt more
from customer input (H2), we include an indicator
variable for individual projects (Indivi) in both stages
and interact it with customer input in the second stage
(IV Model 2):
Ci,tF  β0 + β1Zi + β2Di,tF + β3Indivi + βXXi + ui
FSi  γ0 + γ1Ci,tF + γ2Di,tF + γ3Ci,tF ×Di,tF + γ4Indivi
+ γ5Ci,tF × Indivi + γUuˆi + γUDuˆi ×Di,tF
+ γUIuˆi × Indivi + γXXi + vi.
We next describe how we test in the cross-sectional
IV model whether project revisions mediate the effect
of customer input on funding success (H3). In the initial
model (IV Model 1), funding success is the dependent
variable, customer input is the explanatory variable,
and we are interested in FSi  γCCi,tF . In a mediation
model (e.g., Singh and Fleming 2010), a mediator is
a third variable “which represents the generative mech-
anism through which the focal [explanatory] variable
[Ci,tF ] is able to inﬂuence the dependent variable [FSi]
of interest” (Baron and Kenny 1986, p. 1173). In our
case, the mediator is the number of project revisions
(Ri,tF ), and we are interested inRi,tF  δCi,tF and FSi 
γRRi,tF . We again use the introduction of the mobile app
as an instrument, but this timewe use it for themediator
Ri,tF . Because project creators cannot revise their project
using the app, there is no direct causal link between
the introduction of the app and increased revisions.
Therefore, the number of revisions is independent of
the instrument and can only be inﬂuenced by increased
customer input (∂). Any effect of the instrumented
number of project revisions on funding success then
represents γR as a result of ∂. We thus arrive at the
following models for H3 in the ﬁrst and second stage,
respectively (IV Model 3):
Ri,tF  β0 + β1Zi + βXXi + ui
FSi  γ0 + γ1Ri,tF + γUuˆi + γXXi + vi.
We exclude 218 outlier projects whose customer
input is greater than or equal to the 99th percentile (96
comments) to avoid nonconvergence due to quasi-
complete separation during the logit estimation (Altman
et al. 2004). Because projects above the 99th percentile
are 76%more likely to be successful than projects below
(86% vs. 49%), the exclusion of outliers also allows us to
report more conservative estimates.
4.4. Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and Table 2 the
correlations for the IV models without outliers. We
report no multicollinearity issues.
Table 3, IV Model 1, shows the results relevant to H1
and H4. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive effect of cus-
tomer input on funding success (H1) while control-
ling for unobserved confounders in the second stage
(γ1 = 0.36, p < 0.01). Every comment that is posted
before a project is funded increases by 43% the likeli-
hood that the project will eventually exceed its target.13
The interaction between distant funding experience
and customer input (H4) is also signiﬁcant (γ3 = 0.23,
p < 0.01). A one-unit increase in distant funding
experience results in an additional 26% increase in
the likelihood of funding success per comment. Al-
though all customer input increases the likelihood of
a successful campaign, input from customers with
distant funding experience does so at a faster rate (see
Figure 3).
In IV Model 2, the moderating effect of individual
project creators (H2) in the second stage is signiﬁcant
and positive (γ5 = 0.03, p < 0.01; 3% additional increase
in funding likelihood for each comment). As can be
seen in the second column, projects run by a single
individual are generally less likely to be successful
(γ4 = −0.33, p< 0.05; 28% less likely). The larger positive
effect of customer input for individual creators thus
partly compensates for their disadvantage.
To test the mediating role of project revisions (H3),
we regress project revisions on the instrumental vari-
able. First, we again evaluate the quality of the in-
strumental variable in a model without controls. We
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ﬁnd the expected signiﬁcant positive effect on project
revisions (β1 = 0.61, p < 0.01) and a ﬁrst-stage F-statistic
of 167.63, well above the common threshold of 10 and
indicating a strong instrumental variable. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant residuals in the second stage, which indicate
an endogeneity problem and thus justify the use of an
instrumental variable (γU = −0.36, p < 0.01). In the full
IV Model 3 with all controls, the instrumented effect
of project revisions on funding success is positive and
signiﬁcant while controlling for unobserved con-
founders (γ1 = 0.34, p < 0.01). Supporting H3, every
project revision increases the likelihood of funding
success by 40% (see Figure 4).
We conduct a number of additional empirical ana-
lyses to check the robustness of the results. First, we
also estimate a multinomial logit model of funding
success. To do so, we partition funding success into
four categories: substantially under target (less than
75% of the goal was raised), slightly under target (more
than 75% but less than 100% of the goal was raised),
slightly over target (more than 100% but less than 112%
of the goal was raised; 112% is the 75th percentile of the
funding ratio), and substantially over target (more than
112% of the goal was raised). Customer input signiﬁ-
cantly increases the chances of a project being in any
higher funding level, especially for the >112% level.
Second, more experienced creators may set lower
goals to increase their chances of success. In addition to
controlling for goal, we examine the correlation be-
tween project creators’ preparedness (including fund-
ing experience, number of pictures, and length of the
risks section) and project goal. The correlations are
signiﬁcantly positive (p < 0.01), suggesting that expe-
rienced and well-prepared creators set higher goals.
Third, there was a different payment system in place
for UK-based projects during the data-collection time
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the IV Models (n = 21,273)
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Funding success 0.48 0.50 0 1
Mobile app 0.51 0.50 0 1
Customer input 2.54 8.03 0 91
Distant funding experience 0.73 0.39 0 1
Individual creator 0.40 0.49 0 1
Project revisions 3.43 3.48 0 47
Duration 32.58 10.36 8 61
Creator experience 0.09 0.54 0 22
Goal (ln) 8.57 1.46 0 17
Currency (GBP = 1) 0.10 0.30 0 1
Videos 1.06 0.92 0 23
Incorporated 0.02 0.14 0 1
Website 0.86 0.35 0 1
Risks section 142.35 117.72 0 7,291
Previous customer engagement 1.56 6.09 0 111
Table 2. Correlation Matrix for the IV Models (n = 21,273)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
(1) Funding success 1
(2) Customer input 0.19*** 1
(3) Distant funding
experience
−0.29*** −0.37*** 1
(4) Individual creator −0.08*** −0.07*** 0.06*** 1
(5) Project revisions −0.07*** 0.27*** −0.19*** −0.05*** 1
(6) Duration −0.12*** 0.03*** −0.03*** −0.03*** 0.12*** 1
(7) Creator experience 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.01 0 −0.02*** −0.04*** 1
(8) Goal (ln) −0.26*** 0.22*** −0.18*** −0.14*** 0.31*** 0.21*** −0.09*** 1
(9) Currency (GBP = 1) −0.08*** 0 0.03*** −0.01 0.02*** 0 0 0 1
(10) Videos 0.06*** 0.11*** −0.13*** −0.08*** 0.11*** 0.02*** −0.02*** 0.18*** −0.02*** 1
(11) Incorporated −0.02*** 0.04*** −0.04*** −0.08*** 0.04*** 0.01* −0.01 0.09*** 0 0.02** 1
(12) Website 0.1*** 0.07*** −0.1*** −0.05*** 0.07*** 0.01* 0.01 0.08*** −0.02*** 0.12*** 0.03*** 1
(13) Risks section −0.01 0.09*** −0.09*** −0.06*** 0.12*** 0.03*** −0.01 0.21*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 1
(14) Previous
customer
engagement
0.06*** 0.18*** −0.14*** −0.01* 0.09*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03***
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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frame. This could bias the results of the two-stage
estimation procedure with the mobile app as the in-
strument. We run the IV model without UK-based
projects and ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive effect of
customer input (γ1 = 0.32, p < 0.01).
Fourth, we use a nonparametric matching approach—
namely, coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Blackwell
et al. 2009, Iacus et al. 2012)—to further ensure that
our results are not confounded by the sheer number of
customers. CEM is a statistical technique for modi-
fying observational data to improve causal inference
and to reduce model dependence. This is achieved by
pruning observations from the data so that selected
pretreatment confounders are balanced between treated
and control groups. As such, the remaining data are
better balanced and more similar to the empirical dis-
tributions of the covariates in the groups. In our case, we
use the CEM procedure to create a balanced subsample
in which we compare projects with similar numbers
of customers but varying amounts of customer input.
Speciﬁcally, we put projects in one of three groups to
account for the long tail of the customer-input dis-
tribution (cf. Iacus et al. 2019): no customer input,
a medium amount of customer input (1–12 comments),
and a large amount of customer input (more than 13
comments). We then match projects across these groups
based on their number of customers.14 We reestimate
the IV models in the balanced subsample and all results
hold at the same levels of signiﬁcance (see Online Ap-
pendix C), apart from the individual interaction effect,
which is positive but not signiﬁcant. Given that it is
signiﬁcant in all othermodels and robustness checks, we
are conﬁdent that the reason here is mainly the reduced
sample size.
Lastly, we also run separate models for the following
scenarios: (1) We treat all suspended and cancelled
projects as failed projects; (2) we include customer
funding experience to control explicitly for customer
seniority; and (3) we exclude the 2012 holiday season to
check the validity of the instrumental variable. The
results hold in all scenarios.
5. Panel Models
In our second set of analyses, we use panel models to
exploit the longitudinal nature of our sample. As
a result of this, we are able provide additional support
for the initial results of the IV models and analyse the
effect of customer input on funding in a dynamic way.
The panel models add to the robustness of our results
in three ways: (1) The temporal separation of cus-
tomer input and subsequent funding allows us to
rule out reverse causality; (2) project ﬁxed effects,
which remove all constant effects from the estima-
tion, allow us to control for project quality and creator
ability in a different way than with the instrumental
variable; and (3) we can explicitly control for social
learning.
The panel data contain an unbalanced set of 12-hour
observations for each project, from the project’s ﬁrst
public appearance on Kickstarter.com until the cam-
paign ends. As some variables require two lags, the
ﬁrst two observations for each project are discarded.
The total number of observations available for esti-
mation is 1,387,364. The dependent variable in all panel
models is new funding received since the previous
period (=Fi,t).
5.1. Control Variables
To rule out confounding factors, we include several
control variables in t − 1, which is when customers
make the funding decisions that affect the contempo-
rary dependent variable =Fi,t.
Most importantly, we control for social learning,
which occurs when people base their decisions on the
decisions of others and which often leads to herding
(Banerjee 1992). There are two forms of social learning:
observational learning (observing others’ decisions) and
Figure 3. Predicted Likelihood of Funding Success at
Different Levels of Customer Input and Distance
Note. All other variables at their means.
Figure 4. Predicted Likelihood of Funding Success at
Different Levels of Project Revisions
Note. All other variables at their means.
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learning through communication (being told about others’
decisions) (Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Bikhchandani
et al. 1998, Cai et al. 2009).
Observational learning is “theoretically a function of
the number of contributors [backers] the project has
received in the past” (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017,
p. 74). Thus, we control for observational learning with
cumulative customers (Bi,t−1) (Zhang and Liu 2012) and
new customers (=Bi,t−1). The former captures learning in
a more static sense (the number of backers grows con-
tinuously), and the latter captures it in a more dynamic
sense (momentum, rush into a project). We also control
for herding around the average amount of funding (Smith
et al. 2015) with the lagged average (F¯i,t−1).
Learning from communication (the second form
of social learning) is often operationalised as word of
mouth (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). To capture
word of mouth around Kickstarter projects, we control
for cumulative Facebook shares (FBSi,t−1). A Facebook
share occurs when a project’s Kickstarter URL is posted
on Facebook, for example, in a status update (these
data come directly from Facebook, which tracks all
URLs mentioned on the platform).
Apart from learning, herding can also occur because
of salience (popular projects are more visible) and pay-
off externalities (customers receive secondary beneﬁts
from contributing to awell-fundedproject) (Bikhchandani
et al. 1992, Cai et al. 2009). We control for salience with
a variable that indicates whether a project is “in the
top 50 of all active projects in terms of backers added
over the prior week” (TOPi,t−1) (Kuppuswamy and
Bayus 2017, p. 78). Active marketing by the project
creators may also increase salience, and we include
the number of new posts from the creators (=Pi,t−1) to
control for that. Project creators use posts to publicly
inform existing and prospective customers about the
project status. We also control for pay-off external-
ities that may arise as a project gets closer to its
goal and eventually surpasses it, using a stepped
funding ratio variable that increases by 1 for every
20% of the goal reached (FRi,t−1) (Kuppuswamy and
Bayus 2017).
Lastly, we include a variable that tracks the length of
time a campaign has been live (TIMEi,t and TIME2i,t to
capture curvilinear effects) as well as week dummies
(aw) to control for seasonality.
5.2. Model Speciﬁcation
The ﬁxed-effects model for H1 is
=Fi,t  β1Ci,t−1 + βXXi,t−1 + βT1TIMEi,t + βT2TIME2i,t
+ βWaw + ai + ui,t,
with Ci,t−1 the once-lagged cumulative amount of cus-
tomer input, all once-lagged controls in Xi,t−1, and ﬁxed
effects ai.
To test H2, we interact cumulative customer input
with the indicator variable for individual projects
(Indivi). The separate, noninteracted, constant term Indivi
drops out because it is included in the ﬁxed effects ai:
=Fi,t  β1Ci,t−1 + β2Indivi ×Ci,t−1 + βXXi,t−1
+ βT1TIMEi,t + βT2TIME2i,t + βWaw + ai + ui,t.
To test H3, we analyse the interaction of input and
revisions using a two-step procedure (Pierce et al. 2015;
Osadchiy et al. 2016; Godinho de Matos et al. 2017).
First, we splitCi,t−1 into its twice-lagged and differential
component:
Ci,t−1  =Ci,t−1 + Ci,t−2.
We then interact project revisions (=Ri,t−1) with the
twice-lagged cumulative customer input (Ci,t−2), which
effectively replace Ci,t−1 as the main explanatory vari-
able (=Ci,t−1 is kept to make the models comparable):
=Fi,t  β1=Ci,t−1 + β2Ci,t−2 + β3=Ri,t−1 + β4Ci,t−2 ×=Ri,t−1
+ βXXi,t−1 + βT1TIMEi,t + βT2TIME2i,t + βWaw + ai
+ ui,t.
The rationale is that customer input requires project
changes to affect funding. Thus,we test the effect of twice-
lagged input on current funding via once-lagged project
changes (β4): Cumulative customer input (t − 2) → Re-
visions (t − 1)→ Funding (t). Because of the temporal
separation, revisions in t − 1 cannot affect input in t − 2.
To test H4, we interact cumulative customer input
with the distance measure (Di,t−1):
=Fi,t  β1Ci,t−1 + β2Di,t−1 + β3Di,t−1 ×Ci,t−1 + βXXi,t−1
+ βT1TIMEi,t + βT2TIME2i,t + βWaw + ai + ui,t.
5.3. Results
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the panel
models. We report no multicollinearity issues. The de-
pendent variable is new funding since the last period
(=Fi,t). Table 5 shows the main estimation results.
All standard errors are clustered at the project level
and robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
(Wooldridge 2010).
To test H1, we regress new funding since the last pe-
riod on once-lagged customer input. The β1-coefﬁcient
inModel 1 has a value of 1.03 and is signiﬁcant (p< 0.01),
supporting H1. A single comment by one user in t − 1
immediately creates $1.03 of additional funding in t. This
effect is cumulative and increases every 12 hours: For
a project that runs for 32 days (the average), a com-
ment that is posted halfway through the project subse-
quently generates $32.96 of additional funding, whereas
a comment that is posted at the beginning of the same
project generates $65.92. For the longest projects (60–
61 days, 1,342 projects), the cumulative effect increases to
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up to $125.66. These are average values, so some com-
ments may generate more, whereas others may generate
less. Importantly, the average customer investment at the
end of a project is $68.67, so a single comment posted
early in the campaign can generate additional funding in
the same order of magnitude as an additional customer.
To test H2, we include an interaction between cus-
tomer input and the individual creator indicator vari-
able in Model 2. The interaction is signiﬁcant (β2 = 4.09,
p < 0.01), supporting the hypothesis that individual
creators beneﬁt more from customer input, because
agency costs play a greater role for their customers.
To test the mediating role of project revisions (H3),
we ﬁrst split once-lagged cumulative customer input
into its components (twice-lagged cumulative cus-
tomer input and the difference between the two pe-
riods) and compare it to the previous results (Model
3A). The effect of twice-lagged cumulative customer
input is slightly weaker than once-lagged cumulative
customer input (β2 = 1.02, p < 0.01), but the difference
between the two periods is not signiﬁcant. Then, we
include project revisions and its interaction with twice-
lagged cumulative customer input in Model 3B. Now,
the effect of twice-lagged cumulative customer input is
nonsigniﬁcant, and the interaction between input and
revisions is strongly signiﬁcant and very similar to es-
timated effect of twice-lagged input in Model 3A (β4 =
0.99, p < 0.01). Thus, the direct effect of twice-lagged
cumulative customer input is absorbed entirely by the
interaction with project revisions, supporting H3.
Lastly, to test whether distant funding experience
of commenting customers signiﬁcantly moderates the
effect of input on funding (H4), we include an inter-
action term between input and distance inModel 4. The
individual effect of customer input is reduced to 0.11
and is not signiﬁcant anymore, whereas the interaction
with distance is β3 = 13.83 and signiﬁcant (p < 0.01).
Thus, the effect of customer input on funding depends
on the distance of the commenting customers.
We conduct a number of additional empirical ana-
lyses that support the robustness of the results. First, in
addition to customer-based controls for observational
learning, we estimate the panel models with dynamic,
funding-based controls (Table 6). Speciﬁcally, we re-
place the customer-based variables with the respective
funding-based variables cumulative funding (Fi,t−1) (Zhang
and Liu 2012, Agrawal et al. 2015) andnew funding (=Fi,t−1).
Such dynamic panel models may be subject to Nickell
bias, which reduces the coefﬁcient of the lagged de-
pendent variable (=Fi,t−1 in our case) (Nickell 1981).
However, this is only an issue for small sample T
(smaller than 15–30 periods), and the bias vanishes as
T→∞ (Arellano 2003). In our case, with T = 122 and
an assumed correct coefﬁcient of β = 0.5, the bias is
approximately −2.48%:
− 1 + β
T − 1  −0.0124.
The estimated coefﬁcient of the lagged dependent
variable =Fi,t−1 in Table 6 is 0.45. Given robust standard
errors of 0.03, any potential Nickell bias in our large-T
sample does not change the signiﬁcance or order of
magnitude of our results.15
Generally, the funding-based models yield similar
results to the customer-based models. The effect of cus-
tomer input on funding tends to be weaker (Model 1:
β1 = 0.79, p < 0.01), but not less signiﬁcant. In a similar
manner, the interaction effects are also reduced but
remain equally signiﬁcant (Model 2: β2 = 3.88, p < 0.01;
Model 3B: β4 = 0.76, p< 0.01;Model 4: β3 = 11.57, p< 0.01).
The dynamic funding-based models therefore conﬁrm
the results of the models with customer-based controls.
Second, we explicitly take into account potential
autocorrelation of the errors. Although we report stan-
dard errors that are clustered at the project level and
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we
also run all models with ﬁrst-order autoregressive
disturbances, and all results hold.
Third, in the previous models we use the number of
Facebook shares to control for the word of mouth of
a campaign. We can think of Facebook shares as out-
goingword ofmouth, as they count the number of times
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for the Panel Models (n = 1,387,364)
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Cumulative customer input 14.44 441.86 0 98,434
New project revision 0.07 0.26 0 1
Distant funding experience 0.77 0.38 0 1
Cumulative customers 82.35 724.28 0 91,585
New customers 1.97 25.40 −342 16,783
Cumulative funding 5,877.79 49,901.08 0 5,702,153
New funding 146.55 1,801.56 −83,913 923,169
Average funding 63.68 103.47 0 5,005
Cumulative Facebook shares 78.56 504.54 0 44,522
Top 50 0.02 0.13 0 1
New posts 0.05 0.24 0 34
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users talk about a project. In addition, we also run
models with the number of Facebook likes.We can think
of Facebook likes as incoming word of mouth, as they
count the number of times people react to a Facebook
share. The results of both speciﬁcations are very similar,
and all results hold.
Lastly, we also run separate models for the following
scenarios: (1) We treat all suspended and cancelled
projects as failed projects; (2) we exclude all projects
that have any missing observations (we already ex-
clude projects with more than 2 days of missing data);
and (3) we include customer-funding experience to
control explicitly for customer seniority. The results hold
in all scenarios. To conclude, the panel models support
the results of the IV models.
6. Discussion
The study contributes to the growing academic literature
on crowdfunding. We depart from the current emphasis
on the exchange of ﬁnancial resources (Kuppuswamy and
Bayus 2018) and instead study the nonﬁnancial impact
of customers on crowdfunding projects. We argue that,
as in equity-based crowdfunding (in which backers re-
ceive shares instead of products), customers’ invest-
ment in reward-based crowdfunding projects creates
a principal–agent relationship between the investing
customers as principals and the project creators as
agents. In this relationship, customers face agency
issues as a result of their dependence on project creators
and potentially conﬂicting objectives (Jensen and
Meckling 1976, Hart and Holmstro¨m 1987). These
issues motivate customer investors to gather informa-
tion on the project, monitor project progress, and in-
ﬂuence product development. We argue that this is
beneﬁcial to project creators, as customer involvement
substitutes for the support usually received from in-
stitutional investors (e.g., angel investors or venture
capitalists; Bottazzi et al. 2008). The implication that
crowd investors are not a passive source of capital is an
important addition to the study of crowds (e.g., Mollick
and Nanda 2016). Instead, crowd investors seek to play
a more active role in their investments to mitigate the
risks of the principal–agent relationship and maximise
their expected returns. Understanding crowd invest-
ments as principal–agent relationships offers interesting
opportunities for future research. For example, are
crowd investors better than conventional investors at
minimising agency costs?
We also link the elicitation of external information
during crowdfunding to the more general concept of
Table 5. Panel Models with Customer-Based Controls for Observational Learning
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3A Model 3B Model 4
Customer input (t − 1) 1.03*** (0.25) 1.02*** (0.24) 0.11 (0.32)
Customer input (t − 1) × individual creator 4.09*** (1.51)
New customer input (t − 1) 1.24 (1.66) 1.09 (1.62)
Customer input (t − 2) 1.02*** (0.21) 0.16 (0.16)
New project revision (t − 1) 128.52*** (8.83)
Customer input (t − 2) × new project revision (t − 1) 0.99*** (0.17)
Distant funding experience (t − 1) −77.73*** (21.28)
Customer input (t − 1) × distant funding
experience (t − 1)
13.83*** (4.69)
Cumulative customers (t − 1) 0.44* (0.27) 0.13 (0.26) 0.44* (0.26) 0.44* (0.26) −0.09 (0.27)
New customers (t − 1) 28.43*** (1.90) 28.30*** (1.90) 28.39*** (1.84) 28.00*** (1.86) 28.22*** (1.86)
Average funding (t − 1) −0.29*** (0.08) −0.30*** (0.08) −0.29*** (0.08) −0.29*** (0.08) −0.31*** (0.08)
Cumulative Facebook shares (t − 1) −2.53* (1.31) −2.49* (1.27) −2.53* (1.31) −2.54* (1.32) −2.34* (1.26)
Top 50 (t − 1) 212.00*** (67.39) 224.88*** (65.92) 212.20*** (67.26) 201.45*** (66.56) 237.34*** (69.05)
New posts (t − 1) 83.04*** (23.01) 78.54*** (22.67) 82.75*** (23.45) 82.56*** (24.19) 80.68*** (22.74)
20% ≤ Funding ratio < 40% 44.05 (30.82) 46.41 (30.10) 44.08 (30.81) 45.24 (30.83) 42.77 (29.32)
40% ≤ Funding ratio < 60% 137.75** (61.98) 144.50** (60.77) 137.81** (61.97) 138.69** (62.08) 136.89** (59.41)
60% ≤ Funding ratio < 80% 204.12** (85.30) 215.39** (83.89) 204.20** (85.31) 209.65** (85.25) 208.90** (82.09)
80% ≤ Funding ratio < 100% 250.24** (104.95) 266.19** (103.48) 250.32** (104.93) 248.83** (105.27) 257.18** (101.77)
100% ≤ Funding ratio 108.92 (117.94) 134.04 (117.47) 109.00 (117.94) 102.68 (118.51) 122.63 (115.15)
Campaign time −0.02 (0.87) 0.20 (0.93) −0.01 (0.87) 0.53 (0.86) 0.04 (0.82)
Campaign time2 0.02*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00)
Project ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 167.84** (71.40) 180.54** (71.35) 168.83** (71.64) 198.43*** (70.30) 232.22*** (81.20)
F-statistic 57.75 79.45 81.26 96.89 55.86
R2 (within) 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.58
Observations 1,387,364 1,387,364 1,387,364 1,387,364 1,387,364
Projects 21,491 21,491 21,491 21,491 21,491
Notes. The dependent variable is new funding since the last period (=Fi,t). Robust standard errors clustered at the project level are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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crowdsourcing or crowd-based knowledge sourcing
(e.g., Afuah and Tucci 2012, Piezunka and Dahlander
2015). In crowd-based knowledge sourcing, a “problem
owner” seeks solutions to a problem from a public crowd
of problem solvers. In the case of crowdfunding, the
“problem” at hand is the creation of a product that can
successfully raise funding. We show that appropri-
ating ideas from the crowd and incorporating these
into the product under development increases the
product’s chances of funding. We also show that, as
with crowdsourcing (Afuah and Tucci 2012), distant
search increases the value created from crowd input.
This is surprising, because the kinds of problems found
in crowdfunding differ from those found in crowd-
sourcing in terms of problem complexity and divisibility
into subproblems. We argue that customers’ role as
principal facilitates distant search for such problems,
because it reduces the costs of problem communica-
tion and modularisation.
The existing literature on crowd-based knowledge
sourcing focuses on two approaches: ﬁxed-problem
crowdsourcing (Dell Storm Sessions, Sullivan 2010;
the Netﬂix prize, Afuah and Tucci 2012) and open-
problem crowdsourcing (Dell IdeaStorm forum andmy
Starbucks Idea, Bayus 2013). In ﬁxed-problem crowd-
sourcing, a problem owner is looking for solutions to
a deﬁned problem, such as the most efﬁcient way to
predict ﬁlm rental (Netﬂix). It can involve contests with
monetary rewards (Netﬂix), and problem solvers may
either cooperate (Facebook translations) or compete
(Netﬂix). In open-problem crowdsourcing, an organisa-
tion is looking for feedback, often via suggestion boxes,
on a wider range of topics (Piezunka and Dahlander
2015), such as Dell’s effort to improve its products
through continuous customer feedback (Bayus 2013).
There is usually no ﬁnancial reward, and customers
participate just to gain acknowledgement for their
contribution (Sullivan 2010). The creation and selection
of ideas is inﬂuenced by an ongoing community pro-
cess, which involves voting and commenting on others’
ideas (Bayus 2013, Dahlander and Piezunka 2014).
The elicitation of information from customer inves-
tors in crowdfunding combines ﬁxed- and open-problem
crowdsourcing with ﬁnancial investments from problem
solvers: The problem at hand (to create a successful
product) is more ﬁxed than an entirely open suggestion
box, but solutions can vary widely. Combining crowd
judgments with crowd investments may offer inter-
esting research opportunities. For example, Atanasov
et al. (2017) recently studied prediction markets versus
prediction polls in crowdsourcing. The prices paid by
agents in prediction markets resemble investments in
unﬁnished products by backers (Mollick and Nanda
2016). To follow up on these studies and the present
paper, one could link the size of individual investments
with backers’ inﬂuence and funding success. Should
project creators listen to the backers with the largest or
smallest investments?
The disintermediation of producers and consumers
is another interesting aspect of crowdfunding. Indus-
trialisation has removed consumers at the end of the
value chain ever further from the producers of goods
(Priem 2007). The reversal of this trend through
crowdfunding and, more generally, the internet can
offer interesting research opportunities for organisa-
tional researchers. For instance, to what degree does
removing intermediaries increase efﬁciency, and, in
contrast, when does it lead to inefﬁcient allocation of
resources?
The study has a number of limitations that present
opportunities for future research. First, we argue that
backers on reward-based crowdfunding platforms are
customer investors, who invest in the development of
a product that they receive as a return on their in-
vestment (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2018). Unlike in
equity-based crowdfunding, reward-seeking backers
face agency costs from residual losses in product utility
rather than ﬁnancial losses. This may not always be
strictly true—for instance, when families and friends
invest in a project, or when an investment is too small
to receive a product and the return is negligible (e.g.,
a souvenir).16 However, previous literature has noted
the dominant use of reward-based crowdfunding for
presales (Fleming and Sorenson 2016). Thus, the ma-
jority of backers who receive a product in return for
their investment are customer investors. As mentioned
above, investigating the inﬂuence of customers at
different investment levels may be a worthwhile re-
search opportunity.
Second, at present, reward-based crowdfunding is
used predominantly by entrepreneurs. Although there
are a few projects by larger organisations in the sample,
the applicability of the results to such organisations
may be limited. However, involving customer inves-
tors in entrepreneurial projects can be useful for estab-
lished organisations, too (Fleming and Sorenson 2016).
For instance, the development of a high-risk product
can be made contingent on a successful crowdfunding
project. In this way, organisations can raise some of the
required capital, beneﬁt from free promotion of their
product, and reduce the associated risks by listening to
customers. Crowdfunding may therefore be a newway
of involving customers virtually and ﬁnancially in new
product development projects.
Third, we operationalise project revisions as the
number of changes to project descriptions, but we do
not measure the extent or content of these changes. An
alternative interpretation of the mediation results (H3)
may be that prospective customers are more likely to
invest in a project merely because they see that creators
were not ignoring customer suggestions. However, this
is not likely in our setting, because neither prospective
Cornelius and Gokpinar: Customer Investor Involvement in Crowdfunding
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nor existing customers can see whether, to what extent,
or for what reasons project descriptions were changed,
as they only observe the ﬁnal version. Yet, this offers an
opportunity for future research to track speciﬁc customer
requests and how they are incorporated into products.
Fourth, the dependent variables are based on funding.
Although this is an important measure of success for
project creators, itmaybe interesting to look at the bottom
line or other success variables. Surveys are an initial and
easy-to-execute way to acquire data on other success
metrics, although, ultimately, one would want to link
crowdfunding data with, for example, IPO or proﬁt data.
Fifth, we use an instrumental variable to control for
potentially confounding factors such as project quality,
creator ability, and popularity. We believe that the in-
strument allows us to report causal results with greater
conﬁdence than with a standard cross-sectional esti-
mation, but it is not perfect. For instance, although we
provide qualitative evidence that the app does not in-
crease funding, we do not have quantitative data to
verify that.Moreover, the effect of the appmay be due to
a seasonal increase in commenting. We cannot rule out
this alternative explanation, because we do not have
data on other seasons. However, the commenting trend
within the sample only shows signiﬁcant increases in
commenting around the release of the mobile app, sup-
porting the idea that the app increased commenting.
In addition, we run several dynamic panel models that
explicitly control for constant project characteristics
as well as social learning, and all the results hold.
Thus, we have shown with two different models and
dependent variables that customer input increases
crowdfunding success.
The study results in a number of directly applicable
guidelines for entrepreneurs wanting to use crowd-
funding. First, input from customer investors can im-
prove a project’s chances of success—in fact, it can
make the difference between funding and failure. It is
good to listen to customer investors, because their
feedback and support to some degree replaces the help
that entrepreneurs usually receive from angel investors
or venture capitalists. Second, customer input can be
particularly beneﬁcial for individual project creators,
but is less beneﬁcial for teams. Third, creators need to
change their project descriptions in response to cus-
tomer input. This is because projects tend to get better
as creators incorporate customer input. Fourth, customers
who havemore experience in categories other than that of
the project (e.g., theatre backers who invest in a video
games project) give more valuable input. Their feedback
might not be as easy to implement, but these customers
offer more heterogeneous insights into the market.
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Endnotes
1Reward-based crowdfunding is the act of “raising capital from
many people through an online platform” in return for rewards
(Agrawal et al. 2014, p. 63). Entrepreneurs and organisations who
seek funding are called “project creators” and investors are called
“backers.” Because rewards are often products, backers are cus-
tomers for these products (Fleming and Sorenson 2016, Kuppuswamy
and Bayus 2018). We discuss limitations of this view in Section 6. For an
overview of other forms of crowdfunding, see Kuppuswamy and
Bayus (2018).
2 “All-or-nothing” means that project creators can only keep the
raised money if they reach their minimum funding goal by the end of
the funding campaign.
3We control for goal and duration in the analyses and discuss their
interpretation in more detail in Section 4.2.
4We only have a complete set of observations for short projects at
the beginning and end of the data collection. As 30 days is the
median project duration, we exclude 1 month on either side of the
time horizon.
5All results hold when we treat suspended and cancelled projects as
failed projects.
6All results hold when we run the panel models without projects that
have any missing days.
7All GBP values are converted at the sample period average rate of
1.58474 USD/GBP.
8Charities or charitable donations are not allowed on Kickstarter
(Kickstarter 2015).
9There may be interaction outside the comments (e.g., via email or
private message), but such interaction should not bias any effect of
customer input observed within the comments.
10We do not “measure” the content of changes. That is, we do not
measure whether creators change researcher-deﬁned product attri-
butes. We only measure whether the sum of their changes mediates
the effect of input on funding.
11The roll-out of the new payment system is outside the sample
period and does not affect the IV.
12 In this model, the impact of customer input does not change as
a result of accumulation, although this may be plausible in a long-
term model. Because the observed time frame in the sample is only
32 days on average, we assume the marginal impact of customer
input to be constant.
13The expected increase in likelihood is eβ − 1.
14We use nine levels of coarsening based on the anterior distri-
bution of customers: 0 customers, 1–4 customers (10% percentile),
5–22 customers (25% percentile), 23–66 customers (median), 66–148
customers (75% percentile), 149–244 customers (90% percentile),
245–615 (95% percentile), 616–1,231 customers (99% percentile),
and 1,232 and more customers. We match projects on a one-to-one
basis.
15Arellano–Bond type models (which correct for the Nickell bias)
cannot feasibly be computed for large-T samples such as ours
(Arellano 2003).
16There are no charities or charitable causes in the data.
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